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YOUTH JUSTICE IN A UNIFIED COURT:
RESPONSE TO CRITICS OF JUVENILE
COURT ABOLITION'
JANET E. AINSWORTH *
I. INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court has been a part of the American institutional
landscape for nearly a century.' Born of the redemptive ideology of
Progressivism, the juvenile justice system promised to divert youthful
offenders from the rigors of the criminal justice system, both at adju-
dication and for disposition, and its advocates claimed that in doing
so, the juvenile justice system would be able to rehabilitate young
lawbreakers and derail their incipient criminal careers. As it reaches
its hundredth birthday, however, the juvenile court has come under
serious attack. Even its staunchest supporters acknowledge that, as it
currently functions, the juvenile justice system is deeply flawed. 2
The unhappy truth is that we as a society do not particularly value
young people," and inequities in the current juvenile justice system
t Copyright m 1995, _Janet E. Ainsworth.
* Associate Professor, Seattle University School of Law. My appreciative thanks go to Sidney
DeLong for his suggestions and comments; as always, they were on point.
'Illinois is credited with founding the first juvenile court in the United States through its
Juvenile Court Act of 1899. Act of April 21, 1899, ILL. LAWS 131-32.
2 These commentators agree that the current juvenile justice system deserves criticism,
although they differ as to specifics of their objections to the system, See, e.g., Travis Hirschi
Michael Gottfredson, Rethinking the Juvenile justice System, 39 Clow: Sc DELINg. 262, 269-68
(1993) (arguing that the juvenile justice system is based on false premises regarding young
offenders' malleability and criminal responsibility); Irene Merkel- Rosenberg, Leaving Bad
Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court Abolitionists, 1993 Wis. L. Ray. 163, 165 (condemn-
ing juvenile courts for providing neither adequate procedural protections nor appropriate dis-
positional programs to accused juveniles); Mark I. Soler, Re-imagining the Juvenile Court, in CHILD,
PARENT, AND STATE 596 (S. Randall Hun= et al. eds., 1994) (criticizing juvenile courts for
offering inadequate and uncoordinated social services to juveniles in their jurisdiction); Charles
E. Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 Norio; DAME J,L, ETHICS & PUB. PoL'y 397, 905
n.36 (1991) (arguing that the presence of lawyers and emphasis on due process of law has a
negative impact on juvenile justice system).
9 Although American public rhetoric may suggest that we cherish the young, the minuscule
amount of government resources dedicated to programs dealing with children's issues demon-
strates that the problems of the young are a low social priority. Americans may deplore child
abuse, child poverty, and high rates of infant mortality, but we are unwilling to pay For programs
to effectively combat these problems, and the meagerly funded programs that do exist are among
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betray that lack of regard. In exchange for being spared from formal
criminal prosecution, juveniles accused of law violations receive proce-
durally and substantively inferior adjudication in comparison to that
accorded adult defendants. Notwithstanding the efforts of a handful
of exemplary public defender offices who strive to zealously repre-
sent their juvenile clients, 4
 most of the advocacy on behalf of juvenile
defendants is only a pale shadow of that received by adults charged
with crimes. Indigent juvenile defendants are frequently represented
by lawyers who are less experienced and who carry heavier caseloads
than their counterparts who represent adult defendants. 5
 Even those
lawyers willing and able to provide vigorous advocacy for their clients
are hamstrung in their ability to do so because, in most jurisdictions
by law and in the rest by practice, juvenile defendants are deprived of
jury trials.`' The trials that juveniles accused of crimes do receive are
all too often perfunctory and barely contested. 1
The traditional rationale for a separate and unequal juvenile court
system justified its procedural inadequacies on the grounds that juve-
niles receive in exchange the benefit of nonpunitive, individualized
dispositions in place of the criminal sanctions that would otherwise be
imposed. Whatever euphemistic label is applied to institutions of in-
carceration for juveniles, however, being ordered to undergo such
incarceration is unmistakably experienced as punishment. 8
 Further-
more, the promise of individualized dispositions crafted with attention
to the social needs of the juvenile offender can only be described as a
cruel hoax. Despite the earnest endeavors of many well-intentioned
and hard-working juvenile court judges and lawyers, young offenders
the first targets for budget cuts. See Bob Herbert, What Special Interest?, N.Y. TINES, Mar. 22, 1995,
at A19 (deploring congressional proposals to slash funding for children's needs, proposals that
would "throw poor children off the welfare rolls, . eliminate Federal nutritional standards for
school meals, ... cut benefits for handicapped children, ... [and] reduce protection for abused
and neglected children"). Legal doctrine has been no more attentive to children's needs than
have government bureaucrats. See Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery:
Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. Rev. 11, 35, 52-53 (1994) (demonstrating that
child support provisions and child custody law are more responsive to the interests of adults and
legal institutions than to the needs of the children involved).
4 1n addition, there are an even smaller number of private and public interest lawyers who
specialize in defending juveniles and who vigorously and effectively represent their clients. Such
lawyers are, unfortunately, very much the exception rather than the rule.
5
 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order The Case for
Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1128 (1991).
"Id. at 1121-22.
7 Id. at 1127-29.
8
 This fact was recognized by the Supreme Court in its landmark case In re Gault, when the
Court affirmatively acknowledged for the first time that forcible detention of juveniles in state
institutions constituted incarceration. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
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do not, and in many jurisdictions now, cannot receive dispositions
tailored to address their social needs.` Never has the juvenile justice
system been accorded the resources necessary to supply the kind of
social services that might provide meaningful intervention in the lives
of young offenders. Given this depressing assessment, should the juve-
nile court survive beyond its centenary? The severe shortcomings of
the juvenile justice system and its intractability to meaningful reformw
have led a number of commentators, myself included, to press for its
total abolition, replacing it with a unified criminal justice system."
A counterattack upon the advocates of a unified court system has
not been long in coming.' ] Although the defenders of the separate
juvenile justice system acknowledge the existence of the procedural
and substantive deficiencies of the juvenile court system and agree with
the abolitionists that the juvenile court has failed to live up to its
institutional mandate, 13 nevertheless they advocate the continuation of
the two-tiered juvenile-adult criminal justice system. Supporters of the
juvenile court argue that abolitionists have an unrealistically romanti-
cized perception of the procedural protections of the adult criminal
justice system, so that theoretically desirable features of the criminal
process such as trial by jury are really relatively unimportant in the
actual day-to-day workings of the adult criminal courts."
The emotional heart of the argument against abolition of the
juvenile court, however, is that the existence of the juvenile court
system shields at least some younger offenders from the draconian
penalties of the criminal justice system) This justification for the
9 A growing number of states have adopted explicitly punitive juvenile court sentencing
policies that prohibit taking the social needs of the young offender into account in disposition.
For example, Washington's Juvenile Justice Act forbids prosecutors from considering the social
needs of the offender in making the charging decision and forbids judges from doing so in
sentencing. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 13.40.070(3), -.070(7), -.150(4)(e) (West 1903 & Stipp.
1995).
Professor Barry Feld, who has written extensively on nearly every aspect of the contempo-
rary juvenile justice system, concluded recently that, Ittifter more than two decades of constitu-
tional and legislative reform, juvenile courts continue to deflect, co-opt, ignore, or absorb
ameliorative tinkering with minimal institutional change[,] ... remain [ingl essentially wire-
formed." Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723 (1991).
11 Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1085; Katherine H. Federle, The Abolition. of the juvenile Court:
A Proposal for the Preservation of Children's Legal Rights, 161 CONTEMP. L. 23, 25 (1990); Feld,
supra note 10, at 723.
2 See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 163; Soler, supra note 2, at 596.
"Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 165.
14 Id. at 171-74. For my response to this argument, see infra notes 68-81 and accompany-
ing text.
15 Professor Irene Rosenberg considers shorter sentences to be one of the primary virtues of
the current juvenile justice system. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 184. She expresses skepticism that,
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continued existence of a separate juvenile court must be given serious
consideration. In recent years, both state and federal lawmakers have
enacted legislation dramatically increasing the severity of criminal sanc-
tions,"' including statutes requiring mandatory incarceration and man-
datory minimum terms for a variety of offenses. 17 As a result, the
United States now has the dubious distinction of having the highest
rate of incarceration in the world, 18
 and has seen its prison population
nearly quadruple since 1976) 9
 With no end in sight to the clamor for
harsher criminal penalties, it is tempting for those of us who are
appalled at the cruelty and waste in such policies to join with those
who gloss over the shortcomings of the juvenile court system and
recommend the continued existence of a two-tiered criminal justice
system as the only politically practical way to spare some young offend-
ers from the full impact of current inhumane sentencing policies.
As tempting as that option is, however, I am still convinced that a
unified criminal justice system is preferable to our present two-tiered
adult-juvenile court system. In fact, I contend that the cultural and
ideological assumptions that underpin the current two-tiered justice
system not only engender many of the serious shortcomings of the
juvenile justice system, but also serve to exacerbate the very policies
and practices of the adult criminal justice system that make it so
abhorrent to defenders of the juvenile court. Critics of juvenile court
abolitionists thus miss the point when they argue that juveniles would
he worse off than they are at present if they were to be tried as adults
if juvenile court were abolished, state legislatures would be "less Draconian" in sentencing
juveniles than they have been in sentencing adult offenders. Id. at 182.
16 As a result, the average length of incarceration upon conviction of a violent crime tripled
between 1975 and 1989. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 174 (1995). By international standards, "American punishments are all but incompara-
bly harsher than those in other countries," Id. at 196.
" For an excellent analysis of these recent trends in sentencing, see Gary T. lAmenilial,
Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81
CAL. L. REV. 61 (1993) (discussing recently enacted state and federal sentencing statutes requiring
mandatory incarceration, mandatory sentence enhancements, and mandatory minimum terms).
18
 As of 1989, the rate of incarceration in the United States stood at 426 per 100,000 persons.
MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT', AMERICANS BEHIND BARS: A COMPARISON OF INTERNA
TIONAL RATES OF INCARCERATION 3, 17 (1991), In comparison, the next highest rates were in
premajority rule South Africa, which incarcerated 333 per 100,000, and in the Soviet Union, with
an incarceration rate of 268 per 100,000. Id. at 3, 17-18. No other nations for which statistics are
available come even close to matching this rate; incarceration rates in Western Europe range
from 35 to 100 per 100,000, and Asian rates run from 21 to 140 per 100,000. Id. at 3, 5.
19
 TONRY, supra note 16, at 173-74. The escalating increase in per capita rates of incarcera-
tion in the United States is unprecedented. Historically, rates of incarceration remained relatively
stable from the 1920's to the mid-1970's. Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison
Populations Revisited, 64 U. Cow. L. REV. 743, 743-45 (1993).
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in "adult court."'" What I am advocating is, in fact, the abolition of
"adult court" with all the assumptions entailed by its necessary contrast
with juvenile court. In proposing the abolition of a separate juvenile
court and its replacement with a unified criminal court system, I plead
for a radical rethinking of the entire criminal justice system, making it
more responsive to the characteristics of all those it touches, regardless
of age.
II. THE ESSENTIALIST IDEOLOGY OF THE JUVENILE COURT
In order to understand the problems of today's two-tiered justice
system, it is necessary first to understand how it came into existence."'
The juvenile court was the product of larger social and cultural forces
at work in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century."
Although the social and cultural landscape of contemporary America
has. changed markedly since then, the ideological assumptions that
made the concept of the juvenile court appear so attractive at the turn
of the century still live on today in both the juvenile court and in the
"adult" criminal justice system, and these assumptions help to reinforce
many of the most deleterious aspects of both halves of the two-tiered
criminal justice system.
The turn of the century was marked by sweeping sociological
changes in the American way of life, as an America predominantly
made up of rural and agrarian communities gave way to an urban,
industrialized America with changing demands on its labor force. As
small-scale farming and handicraft production were overtaken in the
labor economy by industrial mass production, fewer and fewer jobs
could be performed efficiently by the young, who lacked the skills and
2" See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 166.
21 Much has been written analyAing the historical development of the juvenile court in the
context of the Progressive movement of the early part of this century. See, e.g., ANTHONY M.
PLAIT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION
	 DELINQUENCY 3-152 (2d ed. 1977); ELLEN RYER-
SON, THF. BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 15-55 (1978); STEVEN L.
SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DELINQUENT: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "PROGRES-
SIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE, 1825-1920, at 55-156 (1977); JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN:
CONTROLLING DELINQUENcy IN THE UNITED STATES 1640-1981 (1988); Ainsworth, supra note 5,
at 1094-1101; Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187,1221-30 (1970).
22I have written elsewhere at greater length about the social and cultural factors that led to
a reconfiguration of childhood and the evolution of adolescence during this period in American
history. Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1093-96; see also,joHN DEMOS, PAST, PRESENT AND PERSONAL
TIIE FAMILY AND THE LIFE CoURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1986); JOSEPH F. REST, RITES OF
PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA-1790 TO THE PRESENT I11-264 (1977); David Bakan, Ado-
lescence in America: From Idea to Social Fact, 100 DAttom,us 979, 979 —H4 (1971); John Demos &
Virginia Demos, Adolescence in. Historical Perspective, 31 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 632,636-37 (1959).
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strength of older workers. In addition, the potential labor pool in-
cluded a large proportion of recent immigrants from Southern and
Eastern Europe, who were believed to be resistant to the cultural
assimilation necessary for their incorporation into the industrial labor
force. These factors combined to make it both possible and desirable
to delay the entry of teenagers into the work force and to impose
instead a longer period of formal education and cultural socialization.
The Progressive Era heralded the enactment of a multitude of laws to
facilitate the changing needs of an industrial society, including laws
requiring compulsory school attendance, limiting the hours and con-
ditions of employment, and raising the legal age of marriage." Thus,
one byproduct of the industrial metamorphosis of American life was
the prolongation of the period of economic dependency of young
people and a consequent postponement of their attainment of full
personhood within society.
At the same time that economic and social factors provided the
impetus for a legally enforced prolongation of preadulthood and de-
pendency, the cultural understanding of what it meant to be a child
was undergoing an equally dramatic change. The socially shared mean-
ing of childhood—both who is classified as a child and what are
assumed to be the essential attributes of the child—has changed radi-
cally throughout history. 24
 Although the medieval world barely recog-
nized childhood as a significant phase of human development," in
later centuries, the stage of life between infancy and sexual maturity
came to be invested with a set of specific qualities that served to
distinguish children from adults. 26 Children were seen as dependent
25 Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1094-96.
24
 The belief that children differ in an essential sense from adults is of comparatively modern
vintage. For further historical overviews of the history of childhood in Europe and America, see
PHILIPPE ARI PS, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: ASOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE (1962); CHILDREN
AND YOUTH IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Robert Bremner ed., 1970) (five volume
collection of primary source materials on American childhood); NEIL POSTMAN, THE DISAPPEAR-
ANCE OF CHILDHOOD ( 1982) (childhood from the European middle ages to present-clay America);
C. JOHN SOMMERVILLE, THE RISE AND FALL OF CHILDHOOD (1982) (childhood from ancient
Greece to twentieth century); David J. Rothman, Documents in Search of a Historian: Toward a
History of Childhood and Youth in America, 2 J. OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 367 (1971). See
generally LaMar T. Empey, Introduction: The Social Construction of Childhood and Juvenile Justice,
in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 7-15 (LaMar T. Empey ed., 1979); Miles
F. Shore, The Child and Historiography, 61 OF INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 495 (1976).
26
 In medieval Europe, the "awareness-
 of the particular nature of childhood . . . which
distinguishes the child from the adult . . . was lacking." ARlks, supra note 24, at 128.
26
 Beginning in the sixteenth century, economic and technological changes in European
society combined with new philosophical attitudes about human nature to create a perception
of childhood as a separate stage of human development with specific characteristics. POSTMAN,
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and vulnerable creatures, lacking the capacity to appreciate the future
consequences of their actions or to control their behavior. Children's
characters were thought to be not yet fixed, but rather were malleable,
necessitating close adult training, supervision, and control for the
children to become competent and virtuous adults. Because the attrib-
utes of children were considered to be biologically rooted, and thus
intrinsic and invariant, these essential characteristics of children justified,
indeed demanded, that as a class they be treated differently from adults
in almost every aspect of their lives.27
The historical trend toward greater and greater age segregation
and age-specific treatment of the young reached its zenith during the
period between 1850 and 1950, which has been called "the high wa-
termark of childhood" as a separate, cognizable stage of life. 2" More-
over, by the turn of the century, the perceived attributes of childhood
were being applied to young people who would have been considered
adults in an earlier era, but who were now classified as a new subclass
of child—the adolescent." Given the social construction of childhood
prevalent during the Progressive Era, it is unsurprising that the legal
status and treatment of young people in this period reflected these
assumptions about their inherent characteristics.'"
This, then, was the cultural context in which the juvenile court
was created and flourished.'' Juveniles were thought to be so intrinsi-
cally different from adults as to inescapably compel the creation for
them of an entirely separate and independent justice system. The
juvenile court was distinguished from the criminal justice system by its
refusal to confine its jurisdiction to the adjudication and punishment
supra note 24, at 20-51; Arlene Skolnick, Children's Rights, Children's Development, in THE FUTURE
OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 138,150 (LaMar T. Empey ed., 1979).
27
 Arlene Skolnick has traced the connection between early twentieth-century beliefs about
the psychological development of the child and the evolution of social and legal practices befitting
those beliefs. Arlene Skolnick, The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social
Context, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Stunmer 1975, at 38.
28 POSTMAN, supra note 24, at 67.
29
 John and Virginia Demos have noted that "[a]dolescence, as we know it, was barely
recognized before the end of the last century." Demos & Demos, supra note 22, at 632. As
described at the turn of the century, the adolescent was "vulnerable," "pliant," "impressionable"
and subject to a "lack of emotional steadiness [and] violent impulses." Id. at 634-35. For an
extensive social history tracing the development of adolescence in America as a culturally recog-
nized stage of human development, see KEIT, supra note 22, at 111-264 (1977); see also Bakal],
supra note 22, at 979-84; Skolnick, supra note 27, at 61-64.
"As Neil Postman observed, in a hundred laws children were classified as qualitatively
different from adults .. . ." POSTMAN, supra note 24, at 67.
31
 Twenty years after the founding of the first juvenile court system in Illinois, nearly every
state had enacted legislation establishing similar juvenile courts. PLATT, supra note 21, at 9-10.
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of violations of the criminal code. Rather, the juvenile court used the
occasion of an allegation of criminal behavior as an opportunity to
impose on the young offender a rehabilitative program designed to
correct the socially deviant tendencies that caused the particular law
violation."
In contrast to the criminal court, juvenile court jurisdiction and
sanctioning power could be validly triggered by any kind of behavior
considered to be anti-social or inappropriate, regardless of whether it
involved the violation of a criminal law. Young people who smoked,
cursed, stayed away from school, or whose parents found them in-
sufficiently controllable were as subject to the full coercive authority
of the juvenile court as were those accused of crime." Violating the
criminal law was seen as just another item in the catalog of socially
deviant behaviors that warranted coercive correction. In fact, advocates
of the juvenile court system insisted that young people were literally
incapable of committing crimes in that they lacked the moral and
cognitive capacity necessary for criminal liability." To that end, juvenile
judges did not preside over criminal trials in which defendants were
found guilty and sentenced to prison; rather they held "adjudicatory
hearings" at which "respondents" were found "delinquent," resulting
in a "disposition" that sent them to "training school." Today, such terms
may strike us as mere euphemisms, but in the cultural and ideological
context of the world that spawned the juvenile court, such language
exposed the central role in Progressive ideology of the essential other-
ness of the young.
Today our world is as different from that of the Progressives as
theirs was from the agrarian society of the early American republic.
Just as the social, economic, and technological conditions of the Pro-
gressive era created the turn-of-the-century concept of childhood, so,
too, our own era has in turn created a different concept of the nature
of childhood. 35 As many sociologists and historians have noted, the
contemporary understanding of childhood views that stage of life as
" One of the most articulate expositions of the theory underlying the juvenile justice system
was written by judge Julian Mack, a juvenile court judge in Chicago who became an influential
advocate for separate juvenile courts. See Julian W. Mack, The juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104 (1909).
33 For female adolescents, one could add sexual activity to the list of behaviors that often
resulted in lengthy incarceration in juvenile detention facilities. Steven Schlossman & Stephanie
Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48
HARV. EDUC. REV. 65 (1978).
34 RYERSON, supra note 21, at 75.
35 I have written elsewhere in more detail about the reconfiguration of life stages, including
childhood, in contemporary American culture. Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1101-04.
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far less intrinsically different from adulthood than did those holding
the prevalent beliefs of the turn of the century." Children seem to us
to grow up faster these days, adopting adult mannerisms, perspectives,
and activities at an early age." At the same time, adults indulge in styles
and behaviors that would once have earned them ridicule for aping
the young. The strict demarcation between childhood and adulthood
has blurred in contemporary culture.
Despite the changes in the social construction of childhood in
contemporary America, we still maintain a two-tiered justice system of
juvenile and adult criminal courts. Today's juvenile court, however,
would be unrecognizable to the Progressive architects of the juvenile
justice system. The Progressive juvenile court shrugged off due process
concerns as irrelevant to the primary mission of the court, which was
not the fair adjudication of guilt or innocence, but rather the crafting
of dispositions to address the social needs of the offending youth."
The contemporary juvenile court, by contrast, has been forced to
curtail its former freewheeling informality of process as a result of
Supreme Court decisions according certain fundamental due process
rights to juveniles accused of criminal conduct." Moreover, the basic
concept that the juvenile court was not punitive but rehabilitative,
premised on the idea that punishment was inappropriate for children
who were inherently incapable of criminal wrongdoing, has been in-
creasingly rejected. More and more jurisdictions are adopting frankly
retributive juvenile justice systems, emphasizing punishment and ac-
countability as the basis for juvenile court sanctions.'"
38 See, e.g., POSTMAN, supra note 24, at 120-34; MARIE WINN, CHILDREN WITHOUT CHILD-
HOOD 3-7 (1983); Skolnick, supra note 26, at 164-65.
37 POSTMAN, .suirra note 24, at 120-42,
38 RYERSON, supra note 21, at 38-39; Mack, supra note 32, at 119-20.
n See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that due process in juvenile court required
notice of the charges, the right to be represented by counsel, the right. 10 confront adverse
witnesses, the right to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to appellate
review). But see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-5{} (1971) (plurality opinion)
(holding that juveniles accused of criminal law violations are not entitled to jury trial under either
the Sixth Amendment or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
40
 For more detailed discussions of the recent shift in juvenile justice philosophy from
rehabilitation to a more punitive Just deserts' model, see Ainsworth, SUPTa note 5, at 1104-12;
Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the
Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822-96 (1988); Feld, supra note 10, at 717-18; Martin L.
Forst & Martha -Elin Bloniquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing Ideology of Youth
Corrections, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & Puts. PoL'y 323 (1991); Martin R. Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice: Some Observations on a Recent Rend, 10 1Nrr't. j.L. & PSYCHIATRY 129, 131 -47
(1987); Martin L. Forst & Martha-Elfin Blomquist, Punishment, Accountability, and the New_ Juvenile
Justice, 43 juv. & FAM. Or. J., No. 1 1992, at I.
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Given the increased procedural formality and punitive sanction-
ing of the current juvenile court system, the traditional distinctions
between the juvenile and criminal justice systems no longer hold.
The continued existence of a separate juvenile court system would be
difficult, perhaps impossible, to sustain absent an essentialist ideology
about the nature of childhood that justified the system from its incep-
tion. Despite the changes in our society and culture that have altered
our current cultural construction of childhood from that held by the
Progressives, the juvenile justice system nevertheless has clung to the
view that young people are so essentially different from adults as to
necessitate a separate justice system.
As a philosophical stance, essentialism can be defined as the belief
that a type of person or thing has a true, intrinsic, and invariant nature,
a nature that is constant over time and across cultures and that conse-
quently defines and constitutes it. 41 Essentialism is thus ahistorical and
culturally universalistic in its insistence that essences precede cultural
and historical interpretation. 42 in looking at classes of persons, essen-
tialism often credits biology as the source of the natural essences in
question. An essentialist view of the child, then, posits the existence of
innate and uniquely differentiating characteristics of children which
invariably distinguish them from adults. This essentialism accords pri-
macy to that aspect of identity that it calls "child," and in highlight-
ing those attributes, it necessarily shrouds other aspects of identity
that are at least equally constitutive of identity," such as race," gen-
41 DIANA FUSS, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE, AND DIFFERENCE 2 (1989).
42 In contrast, social constructivism posits that the seemingly natural categories of essential-
ism are themselves historically and culturally contingent artifacts. A social constructivist perspec-
tive focuses on the interrelationship of complex cultural and ideological practices that together
produce systems of classification. Thus, a constructivist denies that innate and invariant essences
exist prior to their contingent social production. For a fuller treatment of social constructivism,
see Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1085-90.
43 In focusing on one attribute as primary in the constitution of identity, essentialism brackets
other attributes as secondary. Many critics have pointed out that gender essentialism in feminist
theory obscures differences among women such as race, class, sexual orientation, etc. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT
(1988); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal 7'heury, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990); Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing 11, 38 J. LEGAL Emu. 47 (1988).
"At every level of the process—from the initial police decision to cite or arrest, to pretrial
detention determinations, to the prosecutorial choice of charge, to the adjudication of delin-
quency, through to disposition and ultimate release from supervision—race plays a critical role
in the functioning of the juvenile justice system, with African Americans consistently overrepre-
sented in the system and subjected to more severe sanctioning than juveniles of other races. See,
e.g., Dale Dannefer & Russell K. Schutt, Race and Juvenile Justice Processing in Court and Police
Agencies, 87 AM. J. Soc. 1113 (1982); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Blind Justice? The Impact of Race on the
Juvenile Justice Process, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. '224 (1987); Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants
of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ.
259 (1987); Barry Krisberg et al., The Incarceration of Minority Youth, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 173
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der,45
 and class.° Since essentialism maintains that the unique essence
of the child exists universally, then this intrinsic nature of the child
must by necessity constrain humanly created social institutions dealing
with the young.
Examples of this lingering essentialism can be found in language
used by children's advocates. For example, a recent law review article
by Professor Wendy Anton Fitzgerald 47
 relies heavily on the assumption
that children are so unlike adults that adults can never achieve an
understanding of what she calls the "mystery that is childhood." 48 She
maintains that "a deep gulf divide [s] [adults] from children and child-
hood. . . . Children and childhood appear across the divide, not as
comprehensible lesser versions of adults, but as mysteriously different
from us."49
 Because this difference is incommensurate with adult un-
derstanding, she exhorts us to "craft legal personhood and the law .. .
to accept and even admire the mysteries of childhood forever beyond
our adult apprehension."'" Although Professor Fitzgerald is not primar-
ily addressing the juvenile justice system in her article,71 such assump-
(1987); Belinda R. McCarthy & Brent L. Smith, The Conceptualization of Discrimination in the
Juvenile Justice Process: The Impact of Administrative Factors and Screening Decisions in Juvenile
Court Dispositions, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 41 (1986); Terence P. Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic. Status
and Sentencing in the Juvenile justice System, 64 J. Cam. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1973); Richard
Sutphen et al., The Influence ofjuveniles' Race on Police Decision-Making, 44 juv. & FAM. Or. J.,
No. 2 1993, at 69. In this regard, unfortunately, the juvenile justice system mirrors the adult
criminal justice system in the disproportionate presence of racial minorities among accused
offenders. See generally CORAMAE RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR
(1993).
45
 Historically, gender played a significant role in the decision to invoke jurisdiction over
offenses unique to the juvenile court system such as stubbornness, sexual activity, and being a
runaway. Female adolescents were far more likely than their male counterparts to be charged
with these status offenses and incarcerated for long periods as a result. Meda Chesney-Lind, Guilty
by Reason of Sex: Young Women and the juvenile justice System, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND WOMEN 77 (Barbara R. Price & Natalie J. Sokoloff eds., 1982). This form of gender bias is
less overt today, but can still be found in differential treatment of male and female offenders.
Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Gender Bias in Juvenile Justice Processing: Implications of
the ffDP Act, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1162, 1183-85 (1992) (finding that males are
somewhat more likely to be incarcerated for criminal violations than similarly offending females,
but females held in contempt of court for repeat status offenses are sharply more likely to be
incarcerated than similarly offending males); see also MEWL CI IESNEY-LIND & RANDALL SHELDEN,
GIRLS, DELINQUENCY, AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (1992); Daniel J. Curran, The Myth of the 'New"
Female Delinquent, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 386 (1984).
46
 While it may appear so obvious as to go without saying, the socioeconomic status of the
accused is a key variable at every level of discretion in charging, adjudication, and dispositions
in juvenile court. Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Structural Variations in Juvenile Court
Processing: Inequality, the Underclass, and Social Control, 27 LAW. & SOC'Y REV. 285 (1993).
47
 Fitzgerald, supra note 3, at 11.
48 1d. at 22.
45 Id. at 19.
Id. at 98.
51
 The article in question does touch upon the juvenile justice system, but mainly focuses on
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dons about the inherent nature of childhood typify the essentialism
that still guides the advocates of a separate juvenile court system. i 2
The appeal of essentialism to advocates of a separate juvenile
justice system is obvious, for it provides an ideological justification for
disparate treatment of young persons accused of criminal violations.
Essentialism, however, does more than merely rationalize a two-tiered
justice system. Conceiving of young offenders as essentially different
from adult offenders supports certain attitudes and practices within
the juvenile justice system that constitute some of its most criticized
aspects. The deleterious impact of essentialist ideology is compounded
in this case by the categorization of older adolescents, who make up
the vast majority of juvenile offenders, as children. In considering the
sixteen-year-old juvenile as more like a ten-year-old than a twenty-two-
year-old, the essential attributes ascribed to the child are imposed upon
the adolescent, whether they truly fit or not. Is it any wonder that the
juvenile court, an institution consciously shaped to fit the perceived
essential attributes of the child, seems so ill-suited to the actual char-
acteristics of those most often subject to its jurisdiction? 53
That juvenile court's essentialist ideology classifies adolescents as
a subclass of child rather than as a subclass of adult has far-reaching
consequences, as can be seen by considering psycholinguistic research
on how the creation and use of categories structures human thought
and engenders inferences. i 4 George Lakoff, a linguist who incorporates
the findings of cognitive research in his work on semantics, found that
this psychological research supports the conclusion that certain cate-
gories, which he calls basic-level idealized cognitive models ("ICM"),
are more basic to human thought than others." These ICM categories
the legal doctrines governing child custody and child welfare as its vehicle for discussing the legal
status of children.
52 Professor Fitzgerald was not unaware that her analysis could be seen as essentialist. She
further recognized that essentialism tends to mask differences among members of the class in
question, so that an essentialist perspective on childhood masks differences among children based
on race, class, gender, and so forth. Id. at 98 n.548. Notwithstanding her disclaimer, however, her
repeated insistence throughout the article on the absolute incommensurability between the
adult's and child's world views warrants considering her analysis as an example of essentialism.
"The mismatch between the assumed attributes of the child and the perceived charac-
teristics of some young offenders often leads to their expulsion front the juvenile justice system
for being insufficiently "childlike." See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
54 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES
REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987).
55 13asic-level categories have simpler names, greater cultural salience, and are learned earlier
by children than higher- or lower-level categories. For example, "tree" is a basic-level category, as
compared with the higher-level category "plant" and the lower-level category "sugar maple." Id.
at 31-38.
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serve as templates for thought, influencing the inferences that we draw
when we include something as a member of the category in question?'
Lakoff noted that researchers have observed certain "prototype effects"
in the use of categories, in which some members of a category are
thought of as better representatives of that category than other mem-
bers. For instance, people rank robins and sparrows as better examples
of the "bird" ICM than owls and eagles, who likewise are thought of as
better examples than emus or penguins. Even though all of these
examples in fact fully qualify as members of the "bird" ICM, the cate-
gory has within it an internal logic that makes some of its members
seem to us more "bird-ish" than others. 57
 Moreover, this psycholinguis-
tic research shows that when we make use of an ICM category, we tend
to take attributes characteristic of the "prototype" members of the
category and by extrapolation apply them to other, non-"prototype"
category members. 58
 This means that "new information about a repre-
sentative category member is more likely to be generalized to non-
representative members than the reverse."5° Thus, information learned
about "prototype" birds like robins is more likely to be inferred as true
about less "prototype" birds such as ducks, while information about
ducks is less likely to be attributed to robins. 6°
The category "child" functions as a basic-level idealized cognitive
model, and prototype effects can be seen in its usage. That is, if
someone were to say, "Look at those children," without any additional
qualifying information, the image conjured up is not of a group of
infants or teenagers, but of preadolescents. Even though babies, tod-
dlers, elementary school-aged students, teenagers, and adult offspring
are all members of the ICM "child," the most "childish" prototypical
members are those who are postinfancy and prepuberty. Since these
children represent the prototype "child," then the classification of the
adolescent as a member of the ICM "child" results in unconsciously
adopted inferences derived from our knowledge and beliefs about the
prototype "child" being applied to adolescents. In other words, by
56 /d. at 68-154 (1987). See especially Lakoff's analysis of the inferences entailed in the use
of the category "mother" as a basic-level idealized cognitive model. Id. at 74-85.
57 Id. at 44-45.
58
 Lakoff asserts that "prototypes act as cognitive reference points of various sorts and form the
basis for inferences." Id, at 45 (citations omitted).
LAKOFF, supra note 54, at 42.
°This particular prototype effect, called asymmetry in generalization, is most clearly dem-
onstrated in empirical research done by Lance Rips. Id. at 42, 45 (discussing Lance J. Rips,
Inductive Judgments About Natural Categories, 14 J, VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 665
(1975)).
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calling adolescents "children," our perceptions of specific adolescents
will be affected by what we expect and know is true of prototypical
"children." Characteristics of the prototype "child" thus are exagger-
ated in our perceptions of the adolescent, and characteristics that are
inconsistent with the prototype "child" are minimized, trivialized, or
even completely denied.
In this way, the impact of the essentialist ideology of the juvenile
court is compounded by the prototype effect involved in classifying its
adolescent subjects as "children." Those in the juvenile justice system
who give credence to this ideology expect to see—and so will tend to
see—in adolescents the prototypical childlike qualities of dependency,
vulnerability, and malleability. Similarly, because prototypical children
are said to lack the judgment and experience to understand the future
consequences of their actions and to make wise decisions in important
matters, adolescents will be assumed to share these deficiencies as well.
Having defined the subject of the juvenile justice system as the "child,"
juvenile court ideology constructs the juvenile accused as "childlike."
Many of the most criticized aspects of juvenile court—the fre-
quency of grossly ineffective assistance of defense counsel''' and gen-
eral procedural inferiority to the criminal justice system 62—are directly
related to the construction of young offenders as "children." Because
"children" are incapable of understanding what is in their best inter-
ests, many defense lawyers in the juvenile justice system come to think
that they need not listen to the voice of the juvenile accused when he
attempts to articulate what he wants to happen in his case. Instead
defense counsel is encouraged to adopt a guardian ad litem-like role, 63
II Observers of the juvenile justice system have been virtually unanimous in their condem-
nation of the system's tolerance of seriously inadequate defense lawyering. See, e.g., M.A. BORT-
NER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 136-39 (1982);
M. MARVIN FINKELSTEIN El' AL., PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE COURTS: GUIDELINES FOR THE
FUTURE, 40-42,51-62 (1973) (describing Boston Juvenile Court); BARBARA FLICKER, PROVIDING
COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES 2 (1983); JANE KNITZER & MERRILL SOBIE, LAW GUARDIANS IN
NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 8-9 (1984); EDWIN M.
LEMERT, SOCIAL ACTION AND LEGAL CHANGE: REVOLUTION WITHIN THE JUVENILE COURT 178
(1970); PLATT, supra note 21, at 163-75; Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court:
Therapy or Crime Control and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAW & SOCY REV. 263,297-300
(1980); David Duffee & Larry Siegel, The Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile Court,
7 CRIM. L. But.L. 544,548-49 (1971); Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An
Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1185,1207-08 (1989); Elyce Z. Ferster et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role
of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375,398-99,412 (1971); Fox, supra note 21, at 1236-37; Anthony
Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U.
PA. L. REV. 1156,1168-81 (1968).
62 See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
65 In response to a survey undertaken in the mid-1980's in New York state, 85% of the juvenile
defense lawyers described their role as a guardian ad Men KNITZER & SOBIE, supra note 61, at
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in which rigorous case preparation and zealous defense advocacy can
be eschewed in favor of collaborating with the state in imposing a
corrective disposition. In fact, defense counsel who buy into the essen-
tialist ideology of the juvenile court may be persuaded that vigorous
defense would be counterproductive to the juvenile's true best inter-
ests," which can only be realized with the help of the coercive super-
vision of the state. 65
Indeed, the very concept that juvenile offenders possess and can
effectively exercise rights becomes problematic given the essentialist
ideology of the juvenile court. American rights jurisprudence is based
upon the premise that to be a legitimate rights-bearer, one must be an
autonomous individual.'"' Because "children" are dependent and not
autonomous, actors in the juvenile justice system can ignore the pos-
sibility of the effective agency of accused juveniles in exercising their
legal rights. 67
 Therefore, we need not trouble ourselves over procedural
deficiencies in the juvenile justice system that would be intolerable if
its subjects were deemed to be rights-bearing actors with true agency.
8-9. See generally Ferster et. al., supra note 61, at 398-401 (discussing the tendency of defense
counsel in juvenile court to adopt a nonadversarial guardianlike stance).
"See BORTNE,R, Supra note 61, at 138-39; see also David Bogen, Beating the Rap in Juvenile
Court,.juv. & FAM. C'1'. ,J., Aug. 1980, at 19 (criticizing those defense lawyers who value acquittals
over ensuring that the juvenile court retains the authority to correct the social deviance of the
juvenile offender).
'15 Another rationalization for less-than-vigorous advocacy is that the typical length of confine-
ment for juveniles is much shorter than the adult sentence imposed for the equivalent offense;
lower stakes are thought to justify lesser standards in defense advocacy. This rationale for sub-
standard fawyering should be rejected. Although exceptionally severe sanctions—the death pen-
alty and life imprisonment without parole—may justify an extraordinary effort on the at of
defense counsel, this should nut legitimize providing inadequate defense simply because the
penalties in a case are perceived as light. In any event, it is not necessarily true that juvenile
sentences are invariably shorter than those in the adult criminal justice system. See Hirsch' Sc
Gottfredson, supra note 2, at 27(1 (noting studies that show that juveniles sometimes are incar-
cerated for longer periods than similarly offending adults); see also Susan K. Knipps, What is a
"Fair" Response to fitvenile Crime?, 20 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 455,460 (1993) (citing recent New York
study showing that only four percent of juveniles waived into the criminal courts received longer
sentences than they might have received if jurisdiction had been retained by juvenile court).
€6
 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN
LAW 299-300 (1990). Professor Mary Ann Glendon notes in her CODIDIDIliIRliall critique of
contemporary American legal culture that American rights discourse presumes that the tights-
bearer is "a lone autonomous individual." MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISH-
MENT OF Pouricm. DiscouRsE 45 (1991). Feminist legal theorists have similarly criticized legal
doctrine for privileging the autonomous individual as the legal norm, to the disadvantage of those
who place greater value on relationships than on independence. See Mary 1. Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CAL, L REV. 1593 (1987)
(analyzing the influence of assumptions about autonomy and independence in search and seizure
law and suggesting that these norms represent male values).
1i7 Robert I I. Mnookin, The Enigma of Children's Interests, in IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN:
ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 16 (Robert H. Mnookin ed., 1985).
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Here I want to address what I consider the single most serious
procedural infirmity of the juvenile court—its lack of jury trials66—and
to respond directly to the advocates of a separate juvenile court who
downplay the significance of this deprivation. 69 Using juries as fact-
finders provides a host of advantages to anyone, adult or juvenile,
accused of crime." For example, juries serve as a buffer for overzealous
prosecutors and a check on the rogue judge who is biased or capri-
cious. 71
 Juries also protect defendants from the more commonly found
juvenile court judge whose fact-finding sensibilities are blunted from
the hundreds, if not thousands, of cases that she hears every year.
Choosing a jury trial over a bench trial is generally very much to
the advantage of an accused who can do so. Research comparing juror
fact-finding with judicial fact-finding demonstrates that a person is far
more likely to be convicted if a judge hears the case than if one has a
jury trial." In addition to this greater likelihood of acquittal, those who
have jury trials receive more meaningful appellate review than those
who are tried in bench trials. Judges presiding over jury trials must
articulate the law governing the case in jury instructions, which are
later subject to appellate review to correct errors of law that have
worked to the defendant's detriment. In the bench trials that most
juveniles must receive, on the other hand, prejudicial errors of law can
easily go undetected because they are not articulated. Thus: "W uveniles
denied a jury trial lose out twice. They are more likely to be convicted
in the first place, and are less likely to be able to prove an error of law
which would allow them to prevail on appeal.""
Professor Irene Rosenberg acknowledges that this deprivation is
"significant," but not "catastrophic," arguing both that state courts may
Only 13 states guarantee jury trials in juvenile court. See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at
1121-22 nn.258-61 (listing the statutes and cases in each jurisdiction regarding the right to jury
trial in juvenile court).
69 Professor Rosenberg, among all of the defenders of a separate juvenile court system, has
most explicitly addressed what she sees as the relatively minimal consequences of the denial of
the right to trial by jury. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 169-70.
70 For a fuller explanation of the value of jury trials and of the many ways in which juveniles
are at a disadvantage because they are denied jury trials, see Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1121-26.
71 In holding the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee applicable to the states, the United
States Supreme Court noted its importance as a "safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145,156 (1968).
72
 The most extensive comparative study is that of Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, in which
they compared jury verdicts in over three thousand cases with "shadow" verdicts that the judges
would have given it the cases had been tried to the court. HARRY KAI.VEN, & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 55-81 (1966). Overall, juries failed to convict more than twice as often as
judges would have done. Id.
"Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1126.
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well redress this injustice through interpreting their state constitutions
to grant jury trials to juveniles, and that, in any event, the right to jury
trial is of little practical importance because so few adult defendants
avail themselves of it. 74
 As to the first point, there is no evidence
whatsoever to suggest that state courts are likely in the future to hold
that jury trials for juveniles are guaranteed under their state constitu-
tions. More than twenty years have passed since the United States
Supreme Court held that jury trials in juvenile court were not required
under the federal constitution.'`' Since that time, despite an unprece-
dented expansion in the use of state constitutional interpretation to
extend legal protections beyond the litnits set in current Supreme
Court jurisprudence, 76
 not a single state appellate court has found a
right to jury trials for juveniles under its state constitution. 77
Nor can the importance of this denial to juveniles of the right to
jury trial be shrugged off as insignificant merely because the majority
of adult defendants do not exercise that right. The criminal justice
system operates in the shadow of the jury trial, so that the potential
invocation of that right affects the charging decision and plea negotia-
tion even in cases that eventually culminate in guilty pleas. Professor
Rosenberg concedes that the possibility that a defendant could de-
mand a jury trial operates as "a chip to be used in the poker game of
plea bargaining";" but it is often not just a chip, but the only chip that
a criminal accused possesses as leverage.
Moreover, notwithstanding Professor Rosenberg's argument that
the "sentencing stakes" for adult offenses are higher than for most
juvenile offenses, the jury trial "chip" is not limited in usefulness to
adult felony prosecutions, as Rosenberg claims.• Indeed, the experi-
ence in my home state of Washington demonstrates the transformative
power of the right to jury trial even in courts with limited sanctioning
7d Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 169-70.
75 See McKelvey v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)  (plurality opinion).
76 In the last two decades, state courts have frequently resorted to state constitutional analysis
as the basis lisr their opinions. This "new federalism" has been the subject of many law review
articles, including several symposia on the topic. See, e.g., Symposium, The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L. RE Y. 959 (1985); Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional
Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 1 (1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 HAsTINGs
CoNsT. L.Q. 391 (1988). In the past few years, the momentum of the new federalism seems to
be waning. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mtcn, L. Rev. 761
(1992) (taking a skeptical view of the impact of slate constitutionalism on legal doctrine and of
its utility and wisdom in any event).
77 At least one state has explicitly rejected just such an appeal. See State v. Schaaf; 743 P.2(1
240,246-47 (Wash. 1987) (holding that Article 1, 4 22 of the Washington State Constitution did
nut compel jury trials in juvenile delinquency adjudications).
7H Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 169.
79 See id.
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authority. Until relatively recently, adults charged in Washington with
misdemeanor offenses had no right to trial by jury. In 1982, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the state constitution guaran-
teed jury trials in those prosecutions. 80 Notwithstanding the fact that
misdemeanor sentences are statutorily limited to one year in length
and are generally considerably shorter, the newly created right to jury
trials for misdemeanor defendants completely changed the dynamics
of practice in the municipal and district courts. None of us who prac-
ticed before and after the advent of jury trials in municipal court would
deny that the change has been dramatic, and for the better. Prosecu-
tors have become more realistic in their assessment of what charges
are appropriate to file and of which cases present proof problems that
jurors are unlikely to overlook. Even though municipal court sentences
are far shorter than those authorized in felony cases, plea negotiations
over sentencing recommendations still do take place regularly, and the
jury trial "chip" is as useful there as in superior courts' Since sentences
of juvenile confinement frequently exceed the sentences meted out in
municipal court, there is every reason to expect that granting jury trials
in juvenile court would have at least as great an ameliorative effect
there as has been the case in the municipal courts of Washington.
III. ESSENTIALISM IN THE CRIMINAL. JUSTICE SYSTEM
As I have shown, the essentialist ideology that supports the juve-
nile justice system entails a variety of detrimental consequences for
accused juveniles. The consequences of this ideology, however, are not
limited to the effects on those tried in juvenile court. In constructing
the "child" with its attributes, essentialism also simultaneously con-
structs its inverse, the "adult." Just as the "child" construct shapes the
practices of the juvenile court, so, too, its necessary counterpart, the
"adult" construct, shapes the practices of the "adult" criminal court.
The dichotomous relationship between the constructs of "child" and
"adult" can be seen as a specific example of the more general role
which binary oppositions assume in contemporary Western culture. The
adult/child dichotomy represents the kind of fundamental binary oppo-
sition—man/woman, rational/irrational, nature/culture, public/ pri-
vate—that characterizes post-Enlightenment Western thought and lan-
guage.82 Structuralist theory explored what it interpreted as the
"" City of Pasco v. Mace, 653 P.2d 618 (Wash. 1982).
81 1 am basing my assessment of the impact of jury trials in municipal court on my experience
and that of my colleagues at the Seattle-King County Public Defender Association, where I was
first a staff attorney and later the training coordinator.
82 STEPHEN K. WHITE, POLITICAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM 15-16 (1991); Joan W. Scutt,
September 1995]	 YOUTH JUSTICE & UNIFIED COURTS	 945
fundamental role of binary oppositions in the production of social
meaning, with one of the paired terms serving as the preferred, pri-
mary term and the other as its subordinate negation or inverse, deriva-
tive of and dependent upon it for its meaning. Later, poststructuralists
such as Jacques Derrida showed that this hierarchical relationship
between the terms of a binary opposition could be reversed, with the
supposed secondary, subordinate term actually serving to generate and
define the ostensibly primary, privileged term."
The existence of our present two-tiered justice system, with juve-
nile court separate from "adult" criminal court, is predicated on the
adult/child binary opposition. Because being a child is seen as essen-
tially different from being an adult, the logic and legitimacy of separate
justice institutions is maintained. Once the criminal court is trans-
formed into the "adult" court by the creation of a separate juvenile
court, however, the "adult" construct that informs the practices in that
institution must be given shape and content. As in other binary oppo-
sitions, the meaning of the primary term "adult" is defined as being
the inverse of the "child" construct. That is, what it means to be an
adult is by necessity the opposite of what it means to be a child." Thus,
because the "child" is seen as dependent, the "adult" must be inde-
pendent; if the "child" has a malleable character, then the "adult" must
have a fixed character; if the "child" is not morally responsible for his
actions, then the "adult" must be fully morally responsible for her
actions. In this way, the essentialism that constructs the child by neces-
sity concomitantly constructs the adult as well.
Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for Feminism, in
Coma.icrs IN FEMINISM 134, 137 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn Fox Keller eds., 1990).
89 principles . . . are commonly defined by what they exclude .. .." TERRY EAGI,ETON,
LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRonucriou 132 (1983), For example, a term thought of as primary
such as 'man" defines what it means to be male only in contrast to the partner term of secondary
status, "woman." As Professor Eagleton explains:
Woman is the opposite, the "other" of man: she is non-man, defective man, assigned
a chiefly negative value in relation to the male first principle. But equally man is
what he is only by virtue of ceaselessly shutting out this other or opposite, defining
himself in antithesis to it, and his whole identity is therefore caught up and put at
risk in the very gesture by which he seeks to assert this unique, autonomous
experience.
Id.
This reversal of the polarity of binary oppositions is the central intellectual move of decon-
struction. Of course, the new hierarchical relationship resulting from the deconstructed binary
opposition can itself be deconstructed, and so forth, ad infinitum. Thus, the structuralist attempt
to provide a foundation for meaning is shown through deconstruction to be chimerical, as
meaning so generated is inherently indeterminate. WurrE, supra note 82, at 15-16.
B4
	 EACII.ETON, supra note 83, at 132-33 (describing how the "female" construct comes to
define the supposedly primary "male" construct as its inverse).
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Just as the "child" construct serves to define the "adult," so too
the juvenile justice system defines the criminal justice system to be its
complementary inverse. In fact, the criminal justice system is often
referred to in this context as the "adult" court. 85 Having become the
"adult" court, the criminal justice system is seen as the inversion of the
juvenile court in its characteristic goals and practices. Because the
juvenile court is intended to rehabilitate malleable youths, then it
seems natural for the adult criminal court to eschew rehabilitation for
its nonmalleable adults.86
Similarly, since juvenile court adjudication is intended for those
who, due to cognitive immaturity, are not fully responsible for the
consequences of their actions, then of necessity, adult court becomes
the forum for adjudication for those who are fully responsible for their
behavior. As a result, the adult criminal justice system does poorly by
those past the age of majority who do not measure up to the adult
paradigm, with its presumption of full cognitive abilities. Mentally
retarded individuals often have developmental disabilities that render
their ability to understand the consequences of their actions at least as
problematic as does the cognitive immaturity imputed to young peo-
ple. 87 But whereas the cognitive immaturity of those under the age of
eighteen is recognized in law by the existence of the juvenile courts,
the cognitive disabilities of mentally retarded offenders receive no such
dispensation. After all, they are "adults," not "children," with all that
these categories imply. Thus, the mentally retarded offender is liable
to suffer the full measure of retributive punishment appropriate to the
"adult" offender, even up to the ultimate sanction of the death penalty.88
85 See Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 163.
do not mean to suggest that the decline of rehabilitation as a goal of the criminal justice
system is the sole result of the dichotomous adult/juvenile justice system. There are many reasons
behind the increasingly punitive and retributive nature of American criminal justice. See FRANCIS
A. ALLEN, THE DE:CLINE OF Tur: REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE
(1981) (discussing the disillusionment with the rehabilitative model in penology and the embrace
of a more punitive criminal justice philosophy); see also TONRY, supra note 16, at 197 (contending
that one factor in the increasingly harsh sentencing policies of the United States is our "remark-
able ability to endure suffering by others"). What I do contend is that making the criminal justice
system the complementary inverse of the juvenile justice system exacerbates these tendencies.
87 Cf. Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty but Mentally ill and the Death Penalty: Punishment Full of
Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DUKE L.J. 87 (1993) (arguing against the trend in the
criminal justice system toward hostility to lack of mental capacity as excusing criminal liability,
including capital punishment).
" The United States Supreme Court has upheld the execution of mentally retarded offenders
in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty
upon a mentally retarded defendant found competent to stand trial does not violate the Consti-
tution). Since then, the state of Texas put to death a man with an IQ of 65. David Stout, Texan
Who Killed Ex-wife and Her Niece Is Executed, N.Y. TimEsJan. 18,1995, at A16. About three percent
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Nor are the mentally retarded the only individuals under the
jurisdiction of the adult criminal justice system whose classification and
sentencing as "adults" ought to give us pause. Ironically, a growing
number of young people under the age of eighteen now find them-
selves tried in criminal court as adults. Juvenile courts have always had
the authority to transfer a juvenile into the criminal justice system if it
was determined that the offender was not amenable to the rehabilita-
tion of juvenile sanctions." In recent years, however, greater and greater
numbers of young people are being transferred into the adult criminal
justice system, some through mandatory waiver provisions" and some
through more frequent resort to discretionary waiver procedures by
prosecutors and juvenile court judges. 11
 Which juvenile offenders do
judges and prosecutors find so unlike the prototype "child" that it
justifies classifying them as "adults" and expelling from the juvenile
justice system? Overwhelmingly, they are the offspring of the under-
class and racial minorities—juveniles whose demeanor and behavior
seem to middle-class eyes to be utterly unlike the vulnerable, depend-
ent prototypical "child.'"2 Once waived into the criminal courts, the
juvenile is transformed into an "adult," with all that the designation
entails. No longer deemed a vulnerable and salvageable "child," the
juvenile tried as an adult is written off for rehabilitation. Instead, the
criminal justice system mechanically metes out punishment for the
crime in full measure, commensurate with the full moral responsibility
of the "adult." Is it any wonder, then, that advocates for juveniles find
abhorrent the idea of trying and sentencing young offenders within
the adult criminal justice system?
of Texas's death row population currently awaiting execution is estimated to be mentally retarded.
Malissa Wilson, Executing Retarded Convicts Fuels Moral Debate, Hous. Puss, Mar. 17,1995, at A25.
"Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in
Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 1 GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 478 (1987).
For a survey and analysis of the variety of statutory mechanisms for automatic waiver of
certain juvenile offenders into the criminal courts, see Feld, supra note 89, at 471. See also
Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1110-11 nn.17.1-77 (collecting state statutes authorizing automatic
transfer of ,juvenile jurisdiction into the criminal courts).
91 Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 1111.
92 Even sympathetic observers cannot see minority, inner-city youths as "children." See, e.g.,
ALEX KOTLOWITZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE: THE STORY OF WO 110YS CROWING UP IN
TIIE OTHER AMERICA (1991) (tellingly tided account by a middle-class while journalist of the story
of two young A•ican-American boys). Less sympathetic observers are even less likely to see such
youths as redeemable "children" appropriate for treatment within the juvenile justice system.
"Most middle-class parents get second chances lot' their kids 
 Society is increasingly intolerant,
however, of the mistakes of children from lower-class families. 'the popular attitude is that they're
lost causes." Don Noel, Trying 14 Year Olds As Adults: An Exercise in Frustration, HARTFouu
CouRANT, Jan. 2, 1995, at All.
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IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED CRIMINAL. JUSTICE SYSTEM
The problems with the current juvenile justice system that its
detractors decry and its supporters acknowledge represent the logical
outcome of its essentialist ideology, and the consequences of having to
categorize each offender as either a "child" or an "adult." 93 The choice
is all or nothing; one is either a child, subject to the jurisdiction and
sentencing practices of the juvenile justice system, or one is an adult,
fully subject to the jurisdiction and sentencing practices of the criminal
justice system. The current system admits of no middle ground, no
sliding scale of responsibility and redeemability.
In reality, the characteristics and behavior of young people do not
change on the eve of their eighteenth birthdays, or at any other
arbitrary point. True, very young children start out life helpless, vul-
nerable, and utterly dependent upon the adults in their world, without
the ability to understand the consequences of their actions or conform
their behavior to the expectations of others; over time, they become
adults with more mature cognitive abilities and moral characters. But
they don't magically achieve adult competence and responsibility all
at once, and still less on a predictable timetable that justifies a uniform
age upon which full criminal responsibility should be imputed. Neither
is it accurate to think of everyone over the age of eighteen as fully
"adult," if by that we mean an independent, autonomous actor with a
fixed, immutable character, acting in conscious regard for the conse-
quences of her actions and thus fully responsible for those actions.
Rather, there is a continuum of these characteristics and behaviors,
both for juveniles and for adults. The two-tiered justice system, in
forcing us to categorize offenders as either children or adults, exag-
gerates their differences and obscures their similarities. 94 Children are
neither as dependent and incompetent, nor adults as autonomous and
93 This kind of all-or-nothing categorization is common in legal discourse, and is frequently
the product of essentialism with respect to the nature of the category in question. "[L]egal
reasoning . . . not only typically deploys categorical approaches that reduce a complex situation,
and a multifaceted person, to a place in or out of a category but also treats the categories as
natural and inevitable." MINOW, supra note 66, at 22.
94 Martha Minow has observed that the adult/child dichotomy in the law—constructing the
adult as autonomous and powerful as opposed to the dependent, powerless child—acts to obscure
the interdependence and lack of autonomy of many adults and to conceal the range of power
and powerlessness in individual adult lives. MINOW, supra note 66, at 301-06. Feminist scholars
have long observed that legal doctrine and theory promotes individualism and autonomy as legal
norms, at the expense of the interconnected interdependence that many people experience as
central to their identity. See, e.g., Coombs, supra note 66, at 1598; cf. Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp:
The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L,J. 37 (1987) (noting that even the socially
and rhetorically constructed self constructs itself as autonomously choosing its degree of autonomy).
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competent, as the essentialist ideology of the two-tiered justice system
pretends."
The faults inherent in the two-tiered justice system are a prime
example of what Martha Minow has called the "dilemma of difference,"
in which
problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating
members of minority groups the same as members of the
majority and by treating the two groups differently. The di-
lemma of difference may be posed as a choice between .
similar treatment and special treatment, or as a choice be-
tween neutrality and accommodation.96
In this case, the "special treatment" of trying juvenile offenders as
"children" results in giving them the second-class justice that their
status as "children" logically entails, but the "similar treatment" of
trying them as "adults" is equally disastrous, given our assumptions
about the full criminal responsibility of "adults." Minow wisely sug-
gests that the law should place less emphasis on the differences said
to exist between children and adults, 97
 and instead consider broad-
ening the concepts embedded in our legal norms to better accom-
modate the actual characteristics of everyone, be they under or over
the age of majority. 98
Only a unified justice system, rejecting arbitrary all-or-nothing
categorization, is capable of recognizing the continuum of our actual
attributes and accounting for it in devising appropriate and fair sanc-
tions for any individual's criminal law violations. Because there would
be no necessity to decide whether individual offenders were "children"
or "adults," a unified court system could be more responsive to the
actual characteristics of individual actors. Freed of the requirement
that an all-or-nothing determination be made, judges could recognize
fine gradations in dependency, malleability, and responsibility as miti-
gating factors in sentencing." There might well be presumptions about
a After examining the work of developmental psychologists, Arlene Skolnick concluded that
"ILI he overemphasis on the differences between children and adults ... results from not only an
underestimate of children's abilities, but an overestimate of that of adults." Skolnick, supra note
27, at 56.
MINOW, supra note 66, at 20-21.
`'r Minow "rejects the notion that our society should answer questions about children's legal
status simply by asking how children differ from adults. That inquiry wrongly suggests that such
differences are real and discoverable rather than contingent upon social interpretations and
choices." Id. at 303.
98 14. at 283-306,
99
 My vision of sentencing within a unified criminal justice system would appear to fly in the
face of the current trend in criminal justice toward determinate sentencing, in which statutory
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the characteristics of an accused based on age, but any such presump-
tions would always be rebuttable. A unified criminal justice system
would contribute to easing the grip of essentialism on criminal justice
policies by erasing the indelible line between the status of adult and
child, and replacing it with a nuanced continuum.
There are, of course, other legal contexts in which a strict bright
line is maintained distinguishing between the legal statuses of the adult
and the child. Certain rights and privileges—voting, driving an auto-
mobile, purchasing and consuming alcohol and tobacco products, and
the like—are granted only when an individual reaches a specified age.
Although such rules defining adult status are admittedly arbitrary, the
transaction costs inherent in case-by-case determinations of maturity
render any approach other than the bright line rule impractical in
such legal contexts where the consequences of a mismatch in catego-
rization are less drastic for the youth and for society than in the context
of the criminal justice system. That is, it is certainly true that some
persons under the age of eighteen would be thoughtful, reflective
voters, and that others over the age of eighteen exercise their franchise
in an irresponsible manner. The personal and social consequences of
such underinclusion and overinclusion in the voting age demarcation,
however, hardly rise to the levels of injustice present in the two-tiered
criminal justice system. It is the magnitude of that injustice that leads
me to advocate the abolition of the separate juvenile court and its
replacement with a single, unified criminal justice system.
Opponents of abolition of a separate juvenile court maintain that
one cannot talk about abolishing the juvenile court without consider-
ing the nature of the criminal justice system,iu° and they are surely
correct. They point out that, notwithstanding the conceded failings of
the juvenile justice system, the criminal justice system is itself not
without serious flaws. 1 ° 1 Again, they are correct. The shortcomings of
sentencing guidelines provide narrow sentencing ranges for a particular offense without regard
to the characteristics of the particular offender. For a recent symposium on determinate sentenc-
ing guidelines, see Symposium, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward,
junicATuttE, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 169.
A critique of one-size-fits-all determinate sentencing policies is beyond the scope of this
Article; however, such policies are not necessarily incompatible with the kind of sentencing that
I advocate within a unified criminal court. Even within a strict determinate sentencing scheme,
mitigating circumstances insufficient to provide a complete bar to criminal liability justify lower
sentences than the standard range for an offense. Such factors as immaturity, relative lack of
ability to appreciate the future consequences of one's actions, and the like could be considered
as mitigating factors in sentencing.
Ili° Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 166.
1 ° 1 Id. at 171-74.
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the juvenile justice system cannot be overcome without addressing the
critical failings of the larger American criminal justice agenda. We must
show imagination and courage in considering alternatives to a failed
criminal justice system that has brought us obscene levels of imprison-
ment and executions without making the streets feel safer. 1 " Where
both supporters and opponents of the abolition of the juvenile court
can agree is that the only criminal justice system worthy of support is
one that is capable of achieving justice for every individual entangled
within it. We cannot afford to strive for less.
luAmong the other visions that might provide the basis of an effective, humane, anti-retribu-
tive criminal justice system are feminist theory and civic republicanism. See, JOHN BRAITHWAITE
& PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN rDIEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990) (civic
repnblicanism); Kathleen Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: SOME
Feminist Questions About Justice, 17 INT'L J. Soc. LAW 1 (1989) (feminist theory); see also TONRY,
supra note 16, at 181-209 (noting that the disparate racial impact of contemporary sentencing
policies insist be taken into account in reforming the criminal justice system to achieve more
balanced and less cruel sentencing practices).
